REFLECTIONS ON REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
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INTRODUCTION

The principal purpose of the Colloquium, as can be seen from the great
attention given to the papers presented by the second panel, was to discuss
the uses of customary international human rights law in the defense of
human rights before national courts. More generally, these discussions
focused on the effectiveness of customary international human rights rules
in influencing legislative and policy-making, administrative decisions and,
particularly, judicial adjudication, at international and national levels. The
initial and wider question of the feasibility of using custom as a source of
human rights rules formed the underlying aspects of the debates in the
Colloquium on the question of the sources for the international law of human
rights. This included the issue of the relative importance of the actual
practice of states and of opinio juris in the creation of a rule of customary
international law.
The Colloquium's organizers wished to be complete in their coverage of
custom as a source of human rights law and decided on a brief inquiry into
the sources of regional human right rules.' This paper undertakes to give
some information, accompanied by certain reflections, on the sources of law
in regional human rights systems, recognizing the obvious fact that the
regional enforcement of human rights in Europe and the Americas is based

* Thomas Kirbo Professor of International Law and Director of International and
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editor of this group of papers, wishes to express his appreciation to Stephen Hodge, J.D.
1995, and G. Porter Elliott, J.D. 1996, for their devoted and excellent work in editing this
issue.
' For a valuable discussion of the reasons for "the advancement of human rights on a
regional basis" see Weston, Lukes and Hnatt, Regional Human Rights Regimes: A
Comparison and Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 588 (1987). The authors set
forth three basic elements favoring the appearance and growth of regional human rights
systems: (1) "regions (by which we mean geographical areas or units marked by relatively
high socioeconomic, cultural, political and juridical commonalities) tend toward homogeneity"; (2) the first element helps create "reciprocal tolerance and mutual forbearance"; and (3)
it is more likely that violations of the rules will be investigated and remedied. Id. at 589,
590.
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on adjudicatory institutions which administer treaty-based rights. A more
modest start has been accomplished in Africa, with the creation of a fact
finding commission alongside the regional treaty.2
I. SOURCES OF LAW FOR THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

A. The Regional Systems
The human rights conventions, in Europe and in the Americas, create
institutions and give them an essentially judicial nature and role in interpreting, administering and applying an entire regime of rules which each of these
treaties embodies.
The principal regional systems for the protection of human rights
essentially rely on the rules set out in the regional conventions which created
them. Nevertheless each convention in its preambular provisions links it to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, explicitly or otherwise, to
the Charter of the United Nations. The European Convention' in its
preamble provides that, through the agreement to establish the treaty and its
institutions, the "Governments of European countries which are like-minded
and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the
rule of law" have resolved, "to take the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration". 4
The American Convention states in its preamble that the essential human
rights of persons are not derived from their link of nationality with a state
but "are based upon attributes of the human personality."5 These essential
rights "therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention
reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law

2 There is currently no active system for the implementation of human rights in Asia,

either on a regional or sub-regional basis. On the Permanent Arab Commission on Human
Rights established by the Arab League in 1968, see Weston, Lukes and Hnatt. Id. at 587.
3 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, pmbl., opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953), reprintedin COUNCIL oF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, BAsic TEXTS 101 (1985) [hereinafter European Convention].
4
1d.
s Draft Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights, pmbl., OEAISer.
LIV/II. 19, Booklet 13, at I (issued Aug. 1982) [hereinafter Draft Inter-American Convention].
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of the American states."6 The preamble lists the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, together with the OAS Charter7 and the American Declara-

tion of the Rights and Duties of Man 8 and other international and regional
instruments that are not mentioned by name, as documents in which the
basic principles of human rights have been set forth.9
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) ° ,
the African regional human rights convention mentions the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in connection
with the pledge made by the African States to promote international
cooperation. Later in the preamble, the African States reaffirm in sweeping
fashion "their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and
freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other international
instruments adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of
Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations.""1
In their preambular provisions, the regional human rights conventions
recognize that their substantive provisions are influenced, inspired and even
modeled after much of the content of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the human rights language in the preamble and in the body of the
Charter of the United Nations, and the universal and regional human rights
conventions and other international human rights instruments. It can be
argued that the principles and rules of the instruments of the international
human rights system were thus themselves sources for the provisions of the
regional human rights conventions. The issue remains whether for regional
purposes, that is, for purposes of particular regional and national policy
makers and judicial institutions, the national law and the regional human
rights system is the source of the entire applicable human rights system, or
whether there are at least some universal rules and principles of human rights
that have a higher status and thus constitute a minimum standard.

6Id.
7

Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, U.N.T.S.

48.
' American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 2, 1948, by the
Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to the Inter-American System, OEA/ser. L/V/II.82, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992)
at 17.
Draft Inter-American Convention, supra note 5.
10 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, pmbl., approved in Nairobi by the
Organization of African Unity (July 1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) as Banjul Charter
on Human and People's Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEGJ67/3/Rev. 5.
1 Id.

410

Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L

[Vol. 25:407

B. The European System of Human Rights
The provisions of the regional human rights conventions refer sparingly
to additional sources of law. Certain references to international law are
made in the European Convention on Human Rights. These references
incorporate certain specific substantive rules and standards of nonconventional international law into the Convention."
Article 7(2) of the European Convention does provide for the trial and
punishment of persons for acts or omissions which were criminal when
committed, "according to the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations."13 It has been suggested14 that the European Convention
does not include a general provision on the use of general principles of law
because it was assumed that the use of this source of law, which is to be
found in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
would commence at some point.
Tyrer v. United Kingdom,15 a case which arose on the Isle of Man,
concerned the applicability of Article 3 of the European Convention on
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment to birching, a form of corporal
punishment. The European Court of Human Rights was constrained by
Article 63(3) to apply the Convention "with due regard ... to local
requirements" on the Isle of Man.16 The Court took note that judicial
corporal punishment was not resorted to "in the great majority of the
member States of the Council of Europe" and that "historically, geographically and culturally, the Island has always been included in the European
family of nations and must be regarded as sharing fully that 'common
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law' to which
the Preamble to the Convention refers."' 7
The first article of Protocol I to the European Convention also contains a
reference to international law. It states that "Every natural or legal person
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
" In particular, see articles 7(1), 15(1) and 26 of the European Convention, supra note
3, at 105, 107, 110.
13Art. 7(2), European Convention, supra note 3, at 105.
14 J.G. MERRiLLS, THE DEvEL PMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS 160 (1988).

26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1978).
12.
17 Id. at 13.
'5

16 Id. at
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conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law."'" The European Court of Human Rights in two judgments, James v.
United Kingdom and the Case of Lithgow,"9 apparently considered the
reference to general principles of international law in Protocol I to be to the
traditional rules of customary international law on state responsibility. In
James v. United Kingdom' the European Court of Human Rights decided
that the principles of customary international law involved applied to acts of
a state toward aliens and not to its own nationals.
C. The Inter-American System of Human Rights
The practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights provides some indication of their use
of sources of law outside the Convention, when necessary. In one instance
of particular significance, the Roach and Pinkerton case,22 a petition to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requested it to apply Article
1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.' This
case involved a petition brought by U.S. nationals against the United States
on the question of the execution of children. The Commission found that "in
the member States of the OAS there is recognized a norm of jus cogens
which prohibits the State execution of children."' The Commission then

" European Convention, supra note 3, at 120.
'9 The Case of James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1985); the Case of Lithgow, 102
Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1984).
20 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1985).
21 Id.
2 Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am C.H.R., 925th Sess., March

27, 1987.
23 O.A.S. Res. XXX adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States,
Bogota, 1945, OAE/Ser. LIV/I.4 Rev (1965). The American Declaration is accepted as the
authoritative interpretation of Article 5(j), "the fundamental rights of the individual", of the
Organization of American States (OAS) Charter and therefore is considered binding on the
Member States of the OAS. The United States, a party to the OAS Charter, is considered to
be bound by the American Declaration. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,
as an institution created by the OAS, has been given the jurisdiction to deal with violations
by OAS member states of the American Declaration. The American Convention on Human
Rights also attributes adjudicatory functions to the Commission. Twenty-three States in the
Americas are parties to the American Convention; the United States is not one of them.
24
Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am C.H.R., 925th Sess., March
27, 1987.
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stated that it had been convinced by the argument put forward by the United
States that:
there does not now exist a norm of customary international
law establishing eighteen to be the minimum age for
imposition of the death penalty. Nevertheless, in the light
of the increasing numbers of States which are ratifying the
American Convention on Human Rights and the United
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and modifying domestic legislation in conformity with these instruments, the norm is emerging.'
The Commission, however, also found that the U.S. had violated Articles I
and Il(right to equality before the law) of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.'
As a matter of practice, the regional human rights commissions and courts
on occasion refer to regional declarations, to the U.N. Covenants on Human
Rights, to certain universal multilateral treaties on particular aspects of
human rights, and to instruments such as the conventions adopted under the
aegis of the International Labor Organization (ILO)."
II. THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

AM JUDICIAL PRACTICE OVER NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OVER OTHER REGIONAL COURTS
A different but significant question is whether regional judicial practice
influences national courts, other regional institutions and the international
system. An important aspect of this question is whether the regional treaties
and declarations are a source of law for national courts in their own internal
human rights cases.
The general question of whether conventional law can be transformed into
customary international law is obviously relevant to the application of the
regional human rights conventions in national courts. The judgment of the

5 Id.
2"Id.

" See Van der Mussele v. Belgium, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1983); see also
Andrew J. Cunningham, The European Conventionon Human Rights, CustomaryInternational Law and the Constitution, 43 INT'L & COMP. L Q. 537, 540 (1994).
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International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case 28 recognized the
possibility of the transformation of U.N. Charter provisions and accompanying U.N. declarations into rules of customary international law." The
scope of use of the regional conventions would be enlarged if the sources for
the creation of customary international law could be considered to include
principles and rules derived from these conventions. These norms could then
be applied by national courts in the region in instances where the regional
convention itself cannot be invoked because of national constitutional
impediments.
It is clear that the European Convention of Human Rights is directly
applicable in the courts of some of the states which are parties to it, but only
because the national constitutions of these countries provide for this. ° In
any case, the majority of states that are parties to the Convention have in
some way incorporated it into their internal law." In Austria, the Convention is part of the federal constitution. 2 In the Benelux countries, the
Convention has a status superior to both prior and subsequently adopted

I Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
2 See Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 96, 97 (1992). Here, the

authors discuss the relative importance of actual state practice and of opinio juris in the
formation of customary law. Id.
30Article 1 of the European Convention provides that the parties "shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention."
European Convention, supra note 3. The European Court of Human Rights has not
interpreted the words "shall secure" as obligating the member states to implement the
Convention provisions into their internal law. See Rusen Ergec, Le status interne de la
Convention europt'enne des droit de l'homme et sa mise en oeuvre dans les pays d'europe
Occidentale, Centrale et de l'Est, in LA MISE EN OEUVRE INTERNE DE LA CONVENTION

1, 4 (1994).
In contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has incorporated the EC
Treaties into the national laws of member states. In Flaminio Costa v. ENEL the CJEC
declared: "by contrast with ordinary treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system
which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of
the Member States ....
" Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 592, 593. It is important to note, as
did Rusen Ergec, citing F. Sudre, that while the purpose of EC law is integration, the law of
the European Convention is one of harmonization. ERGEC, supra at 6.
"' For texts of the constitutions of 12 of the EU states that are parties to the European
Convention of Human Rights, see LEs CoNsTrrUIONS DE L'EUROPE DES DouzE (H. Oberdorf
ed., 1992).
32 id.
EUROpfum DES DROrr DE L'HOMME
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legislation.3 3 French law has evolved to a similar position as that of the
Benelux countries. This is also the case with respect to Spain and Switzerland.' Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Portugal, although dualist states, have
legislatively given the Convention a status subject only to their national
constitutions. 35 Other dualist states, Finland, Italy and Germany have
incorporated the Convention into their legislation with the caveat that,
constitutionally, the internal effect of the Convention is subject to being
superseded by subsequent legislation.' The negating effect of subsequent
incompatible legislation is tempered in Italy and Germany, as it is in the
United States, by judicial construction through which seeming inconsistencies
are reconciled.37
Neither the United Kingdom nor the Scandinavian countries have
incorporated the European Convention into their internal law,3M as required
constitutionally for the Convention to be directly applicable in national courts
and administrative tribunals.
In the U.K. the courts have applied the principle that the legislator must
be presumed not to have wished to adopt legislation contrary to the state's
international obligations. P.J. Duffy has even advanced the possibility that
the Convention is part of the English Common Law where there is no clear
precedent in the law and either one of the following facts exists: (1) the
Convention's provisions can be said to represent customary international law;39
or (2) the Convention provision can be said to be part of public policy.
Andrew J. Cunningham suggests that while there is no evidence of an
express acceptance of European Convention provisions as declaratory of
customary international law and thus applicable as part of the common law,
this has been done in fact in a number of cases. He adds that, "[c]onstant
reference to the European Convention in those decisions thus constitute[s]
evidence of the State's perception of the status of these obligations in
customary international law."

33Id.

' See ERGEC, supra note 30.
35id.
3 id.
37Id.

See SOREN STENDERup JENsEN, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs IN
SCANDINAVIAN LAW 74, 186 (1992).
" P.J. Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L &

Comp.L.Q. 585 (1980).
40Cunningham, supra note 27, at 564, 565.
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It would appear that in the United Kingdom particularly, in view of its
constitutional and judicial systems, the use of the European Convention of
Human Rights and the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
constitutes the closest opportunity individuals have to having recourse to a
constitutional court dealing with human rights. Constitutional courts, on a
national level, already exist in Germany and Italy, and pressure is mounting
in some other European countries for their establishment. It is true that in
dealing with human rights issues with respect to which parties invoke the
European Convention, British courts maintain great discretionary powers in
applying the European Convention, since it has not been enacted into internal
law. Nevertheless, a significant number of cases brought in British courts
seek the application of provisions of the Convention.4'
In France, provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights have
been raised in cases before the Cour de Cassation, particularly in cases
involving criminal procedure, and before the Conseil d'Etat. French courts
have generally interpreted the Convention's provisions restrictively; in
general, arguments based on Convention provisions have been unsuccessful
in both the regular courts and the administrative courts.42 However, in the
41 See, e.g., R. v. The Radio Authority Ex Parte Amnesty International British Section,

Queens's Bench Division, reprintedin THE TIMES, July 20, 1995. In a matter involving a
statute preventing the transmission of a particular advertisement said to be of a political
nature, the applicant argued that because the freedom to communicate "exists and is
recognized in English Common Law and in Article 10 of the European Commission of
Human Rights the statute should be construed in such a way as to limit so far as possible the
inroad which it makes upon the recognized freedom." Id. The court agreed with the
argument but nevertheless found for the other party. Other recent cases in which provisions
of the European Convention on Human Rights were raised in the defense were taken into
account but were not applied are: Derbyshire Councy Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,
[1992] 3 All E.R. 65 (English C.A.) (freedom of speech); and Raziastaraie v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [1995] (English C.A.) (standard of proof in an immigration
case).
42 A 1995 case concerned a French statute which made the deposit of 100,000 francs by
each party presenting candidates for an election non-reimbursable if the party did not obtain
at least 5% of the vote. The Conseil d'Etat considered that the law was compatible with
Articles 13 and 14 of the European Convention which guarantee the non-discriminatory
treatment of the rights set forth in the convention and assures an effective remedy to all
persons whose rights have been violated. M. Meyet et autres, Conseil d'Etat, 17 February
1995, available in WESTLAW. Other recent judgments of the Conseil d'Etat in which
provisions of the European Convention were considered include: M. Sari, decided on 2 June
1995 (the Convention has invoked unsuccessfully to prevent expulsion of foreigners from
France), available in WESTLAW; and Epoux Barry, Commune de Mortefontaine en-Thelle
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past fifteen years, the courts have had to take notice of the fact that the
European Court of Human Rights has found against France in areas such as
the rights of aliens and the tapping of telephones. The influence of
European Court judgments on the highest French courts and indeed on
French legislation is on the increase.43
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC), since the end
of the 1960s, has been actively concerned with the protection of human
rights in the areas within its jurisdiction." In the well known case of
Stauder v. City of Ulm,4 5 the CJEC declared that it considered itself bound
by principles and rules common to the legal systems of Member States. In
a 1970 judgement", the CJEC stated:
.. respect for the fundamental rights forms an integral part
of the general principles of law protected by the Court of
Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must
be ensured within the framework of the structure and
objectives of the Community.47
Subsequently, the CJEC widened its view on the sources for its decisions on
matters in which the rights of individuals were involved. In Nold Kohlenund Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission' the Court recognized that
"international treaties for the protection of human rights on which Member
States have collaborated, or of which they are signatories, can supply
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community
decided on 3 March 1995 (Article 13 of the Convention was invoked unsuccessfully by the
appellants to demand judicial recourse against a decision by the mayor of a commune,
refusing a building permit), available in WESTLAW.
43
See Eva Steiner, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights by the
French Courts, 6 KING's COLLEGE L. J.49 (1995-1996).
The Treaty of Rome, officially the Treaty Establishing the European Communities,
March 25, 1957, does not contain a set of provisions on human rights, although certain of its
provisions do set forth the basic rule of non-discrimination among persons. In its early years
the CIEC did not take into account individual rights under national constitutions which were
raised before it.
45Case 26169, [1969] E.C.R. 419, [1970] C.M.L.R. 112.
46Case 11170, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir
Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, translated in [1972] 1 C.M.L.R. 255.
47id.
4

Case 4/73, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491.
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law."49 In summarizing the CJEC's practice in the 1970s and 1980s, Paolo
Mengozzi has suggested that, "[flundamentally, the Court's method is to
construct general principles of Community Law by drawing from the
common constitutional traditions of the Member States and from international treaties."'
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Agreement) 5 has converted
the tendency to make use of European Convention provisions into an
obligation. Article F(2) of the Treaty's Common Provisions provides:
[T]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community Law.5 2
The language in the Treaty on European Union is perhaps some evidence
of the perceived difficulty in relying on international customary law to
furnish rules on human rights. It is argued that the principal reason for the
relative resistance to relying on custom as a principal source of rules on
human rights is that the internal practice of states with respect to individuals,
notably toward their own nationals, often does not meet the standards
established in either fundamental national instruments such as constitutions
and basic legislation or in General Assembly declarations and universal
conventions on human rights.
The dual requirement of proof of the actual conduct of states ("general
practice") and of their legal commitment to the rule which emerges from the
conduct53 characterizes the traditional view on the establishment of a rule
of customary international law. The commitment of states to such a rule can
be expressed by way of international and national declaratory instruments.
It can be argued that, in contrast, the establishment of a general principle of
49Id. at 507.

'oPAoLO MENozzI, EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW 185 (P. Del Duca trans., 1992); see
P.J.G. KArTEYN AND P. VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNrrms 165-169 (2nd ed., L.W. Gormley ed., 1989).
5'Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
52 Id. at art. F(2).
53See Statute of International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055.
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law under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of International Court of Justice
requires only its recognition by states in their national constitution,
legislation and other policy instruments.' The language in Article F(2) of
the Treaty on European Union suggests first that the provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights are based on constitutional traditions
which the member states have in common, and second that in view of the
source for the Convention's provisions, they will be "respected ... as

general principles of Community law.""
III. THE NATURE OF THE EFFECT OF PRINCIPLES AND RULES
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON REGIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

A. Categories and Hierarchiesof Human Rights
Human rights have been categorized in treatises and other works of legal
scholars, in declarations of international institutions, in multilateral
conventions and in reports and more informal documents of national and
international groups of lawyers. In one such classification human rights are
categorized by generation: political and civil rights are considered first
generation rights; economic, social and cultural rights are second generation
rights; and more recent formulations like the right to development are third
generation rights. These and other classifications of categories of rights can
be placed in desired hierarchies. One such hierarchy of rights is based on
the primacy of certain human rights, which are either simply considered to
be more basic or which are declared to be peremptory rights (jus cogens).
While neither the United Nations Charter nor the universal human rights
conventions contain more than very limited mention of hierarchies of
international law norms, and in particular rules on human rights, national
legal and political systems often take ideological positions on the relative
importance of human rights and apply them in a hierarchical manner.
Groups of states put divergent emphases on the importance of universal civil
and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights
on the other.
In defending the values of the various categories of universal human
rights, whatever their sources, it is tempting for a "Westerner" to assert that

See generally, Simma and Alston, supra note 29.
s Treaty on European Union, supra note 51.
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the human rights which are enshrined in United Nations Declarations and in
U.N. inspired conventions are objectively universal in nature and must be
applied as a minimum standard in every territorial political entity throughout
the world. Under this view, the primacy of universal human rights extends
directly to the national level and also applies to regional human rights
systems. Under this approach, regional human rights law can play useful
auxiliary roles. One such role is that of supplementing universal rules, so
long as no regional rule violates the spirit of the former. Another important
role is that of providing efficient implementation of human rights principles
and rules though fact-finding and adjudicating institutions. While the United
Nations system of implementation of human rights is still tentative and
modest, Europe and the Americas have created effective human rights
commissions and courts.
Clearly, concepts of "higher norms", "basic rules", or jus cogens all
proceed from a hierarchical conception of human rights. The usual assumption is that these concepts are universal in nature and form a set of principles
and rules from which neither national nor regional human rights systems can
derogate. The task of determining these rules is "exceedingly difficult. It
is fraught with personal, cultural and political bias and to make matters
worse, has not been addressed by the international community as a whole,
perhaps because of the improbability of reaching a meaningful consensus." In fact, it is argued that the very standards against which Western
governments and Western controlled international organizations, Western
based NGOs and Western media, academics, lobbyists for special interests
and others wish to measure current regional and national principles and rules
on human rights throughout the world are nothing more than contemporary
Western values. These values are set forth in the various United Nations
instruments which were adopted at a time when the current majority of the
international community of states could not participate in the decisions.
This is too facile a view since there are differences in certain values even
within the groups of states, including the Western group. The disagreements
over the death penalty is a vivid example of divergences between the United
States on the one hand, and Europe and much of Latin America on the other
hand.

56 Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AJ.I.L. 1, 4
(1986).
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B. The Vienna Conference on Human Rights: Convergence and Divergence
The World Conference on Human Rights,57 held in Vienna in 1993,
concluded with the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, without a vote. Three paragraphs of this twenty-six page resolution
are particularly relevant to the issue of the place of regional human rights
law. The eighth preambular paragraph provides rather loose general
references to the United Nations human rights instruments as providing a
common standard. It begins:
Emphasizingthat the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which constitutes a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations is the source of inspiration and has
been the basis for the United Nations in making advances in
standard setting as contained in the existing international and
Political Rights instruments, in particular the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights .... 5'
The second and third pronouncements of the Vienna Conference, of
particular relevance to regional human rights law, are set forth in paragraphs
32 and 37 of the Vienna Declaration as follows:
32. The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the
importance of ensuring the universality, objectivity and nonselectivity of the consideration of human rights issues. 59
37. Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in
promoting and protecting human rights. They should
reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in
international human rights instruments and their protection
60

U
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (Part 1) June 14-25, 1993 [hereinafter the Vienna
Conference].
5 Id.
59 Id. at 29.
Id.
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Prior to the Vienna Conference, the regional groups of states had met,
pursuant to a General Assembly Resolution calling for the regional meetings
to be convened.6 1 The documents produced at those meetings in the form
of declarations were characterized by the inclusion, in differing proportions,
of general statements of policy in the areas of human rights in the widest
sense, including the issues of self-determination and non-interference in the
internal affairs of states, and the affirmation of the importance of certain
specific human rights. This mix of provisions was reflected to a large extent
in the declaration and programme of action agreed to at the Vienna
Conference.
It is interesting to note that no regional meeting was held for the group of
European countries and others. One might presume that such a meeting was
not necessary as this group's views were already reflected in the United
Nations declarations and conventions and would form the core of the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action produced by the World Conference.
The representatives of the African States adopted the Tunis Declaration62
in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the principles declared in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the two U.N. Covenants and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.63 In paragraph 2, the
Tunis Declaration adds that the universality of human rights is undoubted
and that the protection and promotion of these rights constitute a duty for all
States, whatever their political, economic or cultural system.' The Charter
adds the caveat that it is not possible to prescribe a model at the universal
level because one cannot ignore the historical and cultural realities of each
particular nation and the traditions, norms and values of each people. 65 The
Declaration then adopts the principle of the indivisibility of human rights.'
The Latin American and Caribbean States met and adopted the San Jos6
Declaration on Human Rights.67 The first operative paragraph of the San
Jos* Declaration reaffirms their commitment to "full observance of the
human rights established in the Universal Declaration and in universal and

61 G.A.

Res. 46/116 (1991).

Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/AFRM/I4 (1992) [hereinafter the Tunis Declaration].
6 Id. at para. 1.
Id. at para. 2.
6 Id. at para. 5.
6Id. at para. 6.
6 World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/58 (1993).
6

422

Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L[

[Vol. 25:407

regional human rights instruments ...." The Declaration emphasizes
cooperation between the United Nations system and the inter-American
system of human rights. Another major theme is that the "interdependence
and indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are
the basis for consideration of the question of human rights".6
The discussions in meetings of Asian states in the period prior to the
World Conference revealed some active opposition to acceptance of the
human rights rules and principles in Western-based United Nations
declarations, conventions and other instruments, as always universally
applicable and superior to national and regional norms and practices. At the
ASEAN ° meeting on human rights, the member states" agreed to a
declaration which was issued as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of Human
Rights. 2 In one of the preambular paragraphs, it is stated that "the peoples
of ASEAN reaffirm the observance of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Charter. ...."" More significant, however,
are the earlier preambular statements:
[T]he peoples of ASEAN recognize that human rights have
two mutually balancing aspects; those with respect to rights
and freedom of the individual and those which stipulate
obligations of the individuals to society and state;74
[T]he peoples of ASEAN accept that human rights exist in
a dynamic and evolving context and that each country has
inherent historical experiences and changing economic,
social and cultural realities and value system[s] which
should be taken into account.75

Id. at para. 1.
Id. at para. 3.
70ASEAN is an acronym for the Association of South-East Asian Nations.
71 The members of ASEAN are:
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, Brunei and Vietnam. Id.
7 The Kuala Lumpur Declaration is reprinted in Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of
Treaties and Other Formal InternationalActs On the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25
6
6

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 142 (1995-96).
7 Id.

74id.
5 id.

Reflections

1995/96]

A significant element in the operative articles of the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration is the emphasis placed on obligations of the individual and the
discretion of the state in determining the scope of particular human rights
and enforcing them. This power of the state is included even in the four
articles of the Declaration which deal with "Fundamental Human Rights."
While the first sentence of Article 7 declares that "[E]very one has the right
to life .. ,,76 the second sentence conditions the scope of this right to what
is provided for in the national law.' The same approach is taken with
respect to the "right to property, liberty and security of person .. ." in
Article 9.78 Several articles set forth duties of member states in relation to
economic development and social justice.79
The press releases and press reports of the regional meeting for Asian
countries prior to the World Conference clearly give a picture of a divided
group. As reported in a UN Information Service release,s' several states,
including Indonesia, Malaysia, China and Singapore, strongly favored "a
flexible approach to the concept of human rights, one that would take into
account Asia's cultural and political specificity. Singapore called for a
'balance between the ideal of universality and the reality of diversity.' "s
Malaysia reportedly stated that a "balance between
the rights of the
82
individual and those of the community" was sought.

76

Id. at art. 7.

"Id.
8Id.at

art. 9.

final provision of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of the ASEAN member states
reinforces the philosophy that individual rights must be subject to community or collective
rights:
7The

Each member state and its citizens shall endeavor to exercise the
aforementioned rights and duties subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law in respect of these rights and duties to meet the just
requirement[s] of morality, public order and the general well-being of
society. Id.
go Press Release HR/3774, 31 March 1993 (on file with author).
sId.
' Id. Other statements during the meeting reportedly were critical of the emphasis placed

on the rights of states to take into account their economic and social needs in deciding on the
human rights to be given protection. One such statement from the Philippine Alliance of
Human Rights Advocates was reported to include the following assertion: "[Wihile cultural
and religious specificities have an impact on universal standards, they cannot be used as a
pretext to justify their violations." The Japanese representative was reported to have made
a strong statement against "sacrificing human rights for development." Id.
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The Bangkok Declaration 3 contains language on "the universality,
objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights .... .""' These words are
balanced by the following in the second phrase of the paragraph: "the need
to avoid the application of double standards in the implementation of human
rights and its politisation." 5 The third phrase in the paragraph enigmatically attempts to return to the ideas of the first phrase by stating that "no
violation of human rights can be justified."' 6 Paragraph 9 of the Declaration 7 recognizes the view expressed by Indonesia and others, which had
been included in the ASEAN states' Kuala Lumpur Declaration, as follows:
While human rights are universal in nature, they must be
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process
of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.8 8
The rights of women 9 and of the child are the only specific types of
"traditional" human rights taken up in the Bangkok Declaration; this would
appear to reflect the controversial nature of the content of these human rights
in some member states and is at least an attempt to reassure other regions of
the commitment of the Asian countries to these particular basic human rights.
The right to development is elevated to the status of "universal and
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights."'
Paragraph 17 of the Bangkok Declaration also attributes the establishment of
the rights to development to the Declaration on the Right to Development."

83 Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human
Rights, U.N. A/CONF. 157/ASRM/8 (April 7, 1993) [hereinafter the Bangkok Declaration].
" Id. at para. 7.
85 id.

86id.

SId. at para. 9.
UId.

89 No reference is made in paragraph 22 to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980).
' The Bangkok Declaration, supra note 83.
9' The Bangkok Declaration, supra note 83, at para. 17. The majority of the provisions
of the Declaration are clearly political in nature; a number of these stress concepts of selfdetermination. Some provisions concern the right to development and certain economic
issues; others are concerned with the various aspects of non-discrimination.
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While the Bangkok Declaration accepts the general precept that "human
rights are universal in nature" and appears to defer to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Charter, it seems to be more
concerned with giving voice to the "significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds" in
the creation of particular norms of human rights.'
The approach of a number of Asian states appears to favor the practice
and custom of individual states and of states in a particular region as one of
the essential sources of human rights law. Rather than accept rules which
largely reflect the experience and values of countries in other regions and
have been introduced into United Nations instruments, these countries argue
for specific rules which take into account the values of their own societies.
The international community's reaffirmance in the Vienna Declaration of
its support for the universally applicable instruments of human rights is far
from being a promise to consider every U.N. convention or declaration as
law to be applied. The preamble reaffirms the international community's
"commitment to the purposes and principles" in the U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9 3 The preamble also specifies that
the, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which constitutes a common
standard of achievement.., is the source of inspiration and has been [the]
basis.. ." for U.N. standard setting in its human rights instruments. 94 The
Declaration's view on the role of regional law is set forth above.95 The
Vienna Declaration calls on regional arrangements to "reinforce universal
human rights standards."96
It can be argued that the Vienna Declaration's general admonitions to
states and regions to reinforce universal human rights standards is sufficiently non-specific so as to accommodate the Bangkok Declaration's insistence
on the recognition that while human rights are universal in nature their
application must take into account "national and regional peculiarities. 97

' The spokeswoman for the many NGOs represented at the meeting in Bangkok is

reported to have expressed concern at "the emphasis placed in the declaration on 'regional
specificities' and what she perceived as the absence of an unequivocal statement regarding
the universality and indivisibility of human rights". Press Release, UN Information Service,
April 2, 1993.
" United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration, pmbl., 32
I.L.M. 1661 (1993).
% Id.
9 Id.
96 Id.

97 See The Bangkok Declaration, supra note 83, at para. 8. See also supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
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C. Models for Regional Human Rights Systems
A regional system modeled after the approach taken in the Kuala Lumpur
and Bangkok Declarations could consist of a loose arrangement of categories
of human rights, derived from generally-agreed to United Nations conventions and declarations. The content of the regional human rights norms,
whether or not they are set forth in a particular convention, would reflect the
contemporary values and practice of states in the region. Regional
institutions would apply regional standards on human rights emanating from
the legislation, policies and internal practice of the states in the region.
In contrast, the European and Inter-American models rely on the
unification of norms of human rights in their respective regional human
rights conventions. These conventions serve as the basic source of law for
the regional adjudicatory institutions. The regional human rights conventions
also have a strong harmonizing influence on national law and policy.
In the process of drafting regional conventions, under this model,
consensus is reached among the states on rules that will be applied uniformly
by the regional adjudicatory institutions. An underpinning to that consensus
is the acceptance by member states of the substance of the "basic" universal
rules of human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in the U.N. Charter and in the U.N. system's conventions on human
rights.

